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FOUCAULT AND TAX JURISPRUDENCE:  
ON THE CREATION OF A “DELINQUENT” CLASS 
OF TAXPAYER 
BRET N. BOGENSCHNEIDER

 
ABSTRACT 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault described the role of the 
“disciplinary institution” in the formation of modern society. An example 
of such a modern Foucauldian disciplinary institution is the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS currently devotes a substantial portion of 
its enforcement efforts against small businesses and low-income individual 
taxpayers. The IRS collection activity, as directed against low-income 
taxpayers, often manifests in Foucault´s “Philadelphia”-style prison, but 
without walls. The delinquent taxpayer becomes the delinquent social 
class with a diminished earning capacity, thereby directly undermining the 
reformatory goal of punishment. This audit process is a very different 
enforcement process than applied to large corporate taxpayers where the 
IRS continues to follow a “policy of restraint” with regard to the auditing 
of aggressive corporate tax positions. 
INTRODUCTION 
We are much less Greeks than we believe. We are neither in the 
amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, 
invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since 
we are part of its mechanism.
1 
The primary function of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) is not to 
collect revenue. In fact, employers do most of the tax collecting on behalf 
of the IRS by withholding a portion of earnings from workers´ paychecks 
and simply remitting the funds directly to the IRS. Such collection 
procedure comprises the bulk of revenue collection activity by the 
 
 
  J.D., LL.M. in Taxation, PhD. (cand.), Doctorate International Business Taxation (DIBT) 
program at Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria. My deepest gratitude to 
the Austrian Science Foundation for their assistance. 
 1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 217 (Alan Sheridan 
trans., Pantheon Books 1977). 
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Treasury Department of the United States.
2
 The IRS thus operates in a 
fashion similar to a bank teller that must identify math errors on the 
deposit slip and then simply cash the checks. In terms of enforcement 
practices, the bulk of the IRS’s audit activities are directed against small 
business owners and individual taxpayers who, for any number of reasons, 
might appear to be in error on the face of a tax return.
3
 In many cases, 
however, the IRS’s enforcement action relates to a matter of significant 
legal doubt, requiring the IRS to re-interpret tax law and then summarily 
inform the taxpayer that the “error” is a violation of the tax laws based on 
its subsequent legal interpretation.  
The IRS’s view of its enforcement function is dominated by a desire to 
seek a teleological “Truth” in the enforcement of the tax laws.4 This 
implies that for every tax question there is a “correct,” or determinative, 
legal answer.
5
 However, in actual practice the tax law is indeterminate.
6
 A 
tax enforcement strategy based on a determinative premise results in a tax 
administration that attempts to ensure that taxpayers “pay the right amount 
of tax, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time.”7 As might be 
expected, such a “Truth”-finding function results in very little enforcement 
revenue at all.
8
 However, the United States Congress envisions the role of 
the IRS very differently from how the IRS views itself. Congress sees the 
 
 
 2. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DATA BOOK 2014 3, 22 (2014), available at http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-soi14databk.pdf. 
 3. Id. at 22–23. 
 4. Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The Search for Truth and the 
Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185, 
188 (2002) (“The inquisitorial search for Truth can be described as teleological. Punishing wrongdoers 
is a good; there is no right system, except that which leads to this good. So, as long as a suspected 
criminal is found out and punished, the methods of doing so are generally considered right, or just.”); 
see generally DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (Oxford 1996). 
 5. Jeffrey Owens, The Role of Tax Administrations in the Current Political Climate, BULL. 
INTL. TAXN. 156, 160 (2013) (“Finally, for tax administration to effectively implement the tax laws 
and to ensure that MNEs and other taxpayers pay the right amount of tax, in the right jurisdiction and 
at the right time requires the governments to provide a clear legal framework and the resources that 
they need to achieve this.”); but see Bret N. Bogenschneider, Manufactured Factual Indeterminacy 
and the Globalization of Tax Jurisprudence, 4 UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON J. LAW & 
JURISPRUDENCE 250 (2015). 
 6. Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism about Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX L. REV. 121, 
161 (2012); Mark Burton, Responsive Regulation and the Uncertainty of Tax Law—Time to 
Reconsider the Commissioner’s Model of Cooperative Compliance? 5 EJOURNAL OF TAX RES. 71, 72 
(2007) (“One critical aspect of the responsive regulation literature is that it assumes that the law is 
determinate.”). 
 7. Owens, supra note 5, at 156. 
 8. IRS, supra note 2, at 22 (indicating approximately $30 billion in aggregate adjustments 
recommended from the audit process for all taxpayers). 
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role of the IRS as a revenue-raising body with a reformatory purpose as 
well, particularly in the case of minor tax wrongdoing.
9
  
The tax audit process for small taxpayers differs from the audit process 
for large corporate taxpayers. An IRS agent is directly assigned to the 
corporate taxpayer. The agent is typically present on site and assigned an 
office at the corporate headquarters. The corporation can ask any questions 
that it may have in advance of filing the return and vice versa. The 
assigned IRS agent thus operates much like a “partner” in the preparation 
of the tax return to the large corporation, providing an interactive and 
constantly present form of procedural and substantive due process.
10
 
Therefore, it becomes nearly impossible for a large corporate taxpayer to 
engage in wrongdoing. As such, the stated IRS policy is one of “restraint” 
in regards to large corporate taxpayers.
11
 As explained by Snider: 
“Corporations were to be viewed as complicated organisms run by well-
intentioned, well-educated management teams. Harmful acts in which they 
might—accidentally, of course—engage were better handled by gentle 
persuasion or education rather than by arrest and prosecution.”12 When the 
“well-educated management teams” use their skills to avoid taxes and are 
thus required to prepare detailed accounting records of the uncertain tax 
positions (referred to in technical terms as “FIN48 workpapers”), the IRS 
assuages concern that it might ask to see the FIN48 workpapers in an audit 
with an outright policy statement of “restraint.”13 The relevant IRS 
Announcement states as follows: 
The Internal Revenue Service is expanding its policy of restraint in 
connection with its decision to require certain corporations to file 
 
 
 9. Peter Halewood, On Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 131, 
145 (2008) (“The body, as signifier of the crime against order, was sacrificed to right the social 
balance. Rehabilitation or conservation of this body was neither desirable nor thinkable; law demanded 
the public and visible erasure of the criminal body. Only with modernity did law, psychology and 
penology begin to consider the virtues of reconstituting the body and soul of the condemned through 
discipline, surveillance and labor.”). 
 10. See OECD, Co-operative Compliance: A Framework: From Enhanced Relationship to Co-
operative Compliance, OECD Publishing (2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/administration/ 
co-operative-compliance.htm. 
 11. IRS, Announcement 2010-76, “Requests for Documents Provided to Independent Auditors, 
Policy of Restraint and Uncertain Tax Positions,” available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/a-10-
76.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2015). 
 12. Laureen Snider, Theft of Time: Disciplining Through Science and Law, 40 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 89, 91 (2002). 
 13. Bret Wells, Voluntary Compliance: “This Return Might Be Correct but Probably Isn’t”, 29 
VA. TAX REV. 645, 65667 (2010) (“The concern expressed in the comment letters was that this tax 
self-assessment would provide a “roadmap” for tax authorities to identify taxpayers for audit and for 
identifying issues for audit.”). 
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Schedule [Uncertain Tax Positions], Uncertain Tax Position 
Statement, and will forgo seeking particular documents that relate to 
uncertain tax positions and the workpapers that document the 
completion of Schedule UTP.
14
  
To date, the IRS does not appear to have used the FIN48 records of a large 
corporation as part of the audit process.
15
 In general, large corporations in 
the United States receive both procedural and substantive due process 
rights in an IRS examination far beyond anything afforded to any other 
class of persons under the U.S. Constitution.
16
 For example, upon any 
technical change in the tax law, the drafter of the Treasury regulations is 
typically re-employed by a large accounting firm to advise large corporate 
taxpayers as a technical expert on how to avoid the very tax regulations 
that person just created. This might be appropriately referred to as 
“creative” due process (i.e., the special ability of large corporations to 
create and define the substantive tax procedure to which they are expected 
to comply). Small businesses and individuals are afforded no such 
“creative” due process. The closest historical corollary for special rights 
afforded to large corporations in the modern United States may be the 
special legal rights of the nobility and property owners in feudal 
societies.
17
  
The audit process of the large corporate taxpayer is particularly 
distinguishable from that of individuals or small business taxpayers. The 
IRS keeps this latter group of taxpayers under a nearly constant state of 
electronic surveillance.
18
 For these taxpayers, the IRS operates as an 
 
 
 14. Zuba, supra note 11, at 1 (citing Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) ASC 740-
10). 
 15. See Wells, supra note 13, at 656 (“Consequently, FIN 48 requires a company to create FIN 
48 workpapers for each separate uncertain tax position and in those workpapers the company must 
provide the basis for its assertion as to why the company either believes that the tax position is 
sustainable (and thus the financial statement benefits are recognized in whole or in part) or must state 
the basis for why the company believes that the tax position is not sustainable”). 
 16. See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 
1134–36 (1984). 
 17. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 192 (“In certain societies, of which the feudal régime is only one 
example, it may be said that individualization is greatest where sovereignty is exercised and in the 
higher echelons of power. The more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an 
individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual reproductions.”).  
 18. For an illustration of the inspecting “gaze” in the context of the modern advertising industry 
see, e.g., Allison Clyne Tschannen, An Argument for Incentivizing Voluntary Regulation of the 
Fashion and Modeling Industries, 6 WASH. U. JUR. REV. 421, 424 (2014) (“Just a gaze. An inspecting 
gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his 
own overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against himself.”). 
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actuary and statistician to identify potential misdeeds.
19
 As explained in 
detail by Professor Bryan Camp, the IRS audit process of individuals and 
small taxpayers is an “inquisitorial” process in which the decision-maker 
also collects the evidence to be used in making the decision.
20
 Notably, 
there is no adversarial process in any tax proceeding as the IRS revenue 
agent cannot be adversarial against herself. Hence, the taxpayers who most 
need the adversarial proceeding are unable to access it.
21
 The IRS operates 
as both the finder of fact and the decider of law. In lay terms, the IRS 
functions as the prosecutor, judge, and jury.  
In the enforcement practice against small businesses and low-income 
taxpayers, the “Truth” is not relative, and there is no policy of restraint. 
The IRS will often use coercive, deceptive, or third-party queries to obtain 
whatever information it wants and will occasionally turn that information 
over to the United States Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. 
Indeed, the IRS may conduct its investigation against individuals and 
small businesses in secret and without regard to any Constitutional rights, 
particularly privacy rights, of the taxpayer. Foucault puts the current IRS 
enforcement practices in historical perspective as follows: 
In France, as in most European countries, with the notable 
exception of England, the entire criminal procedure, right up to the 
sentence, remained secret . . . . The preliminary investigation was 
carried out “as diligently and secretly as may be”, as the edict of 
1498 put it. . . . The magistrate, for his part, had the right to accept 
anonymous denunciations, to conceal from the accused the nature of 
the action, to question him with a view to catching him out, to use 
insinuations. (Up to the eighteenth century, lengthy arguments took 
place as to whether, in the course of “captious” questioning, it was 
lawful for the judge to use false promises, lies, words with double 
meaning—a whole casuistry of legal bad faith.)22 
 
 
 19. Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 771, 
774 (1988).  
 20. See generally Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (2004) 
 21. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J. 
57, 124 (“Ironically, the adversarial check of judicial review is simply unavailable to the class of 
taxpayers we should worry about the most. . . . By definition, they do not have the ability to gather the 
information necessary to trigger the exercise of discretion, much less to trigger a meaningful review. 
By definition, they do not have the money to hire someone to do it for them. These are serious barriers 
to voice. Nor are taxpayer assistance clinics able to serve anywhere close to a reasonable number of 
taxpayers.”).  
 22. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 35.  
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The fundamental unfairness of the IRS audit process to individual 
taxpayers was the subject of Congressional hearings, resulting in the 
appointment of a Taxpayer Advocate at the IRS.
23
 Nonetheless, for the 
individual or small business taxpayer who comes under audit, it 
immediately becomes clear that the tax system of the United States still 
operates under the pre-Renaissance inquisitorial tax collection system. 
But, in the modern period, an even worse fate has been devised. The 
modern tax collector may assess taxes not only on what he finds at the 
present time but also upon property or profits the taxpayer might get in the 
future.
24
 The possibility to levy on future profits of the individual taxpayer 
or small business represents the greatest expansion of the taxing power in 
the history of mankind. This is analogous to the financial “execution” of 
the taxpayer, as described in lurid detail by Foucault. By taking future 
property to pay the levy of a tax on a prior period, the process thus creates 
a real debtor´s prison for the taxpayer without walls.
25
  
Thus, the primary purpose of the IRS is not to collect revenue but 
instead to create within the United States a “delinquent” class of persons 
who are in a permanent state of tax debt and who can never escape. Rather 
than confine these persons behind the walls of a prison and impose 
Foucauldian-style discipline with the making of license plates, the 
delinquent class is now allowed to roam free; they are allowed to exist and 
to provide for their children without a bank account, relying instead upon 
“payday lenders” and check-cashing stores. The IRS uses the term 
“delinquent” taxpayers to describe this class of persons. In Discipline and 
Punish, Foucault uses the same terminology for the “delinquent class” 
within society. Foucault argues that the bureaucracy of the prison itself is 
the creator and cause of delinquency within society.
26
 Here, the parallel 
argument is that the bureaucracy of the IRS itself is the leading 
preventable cause of social delinquency in the United States.  
 
 
 23. Camp, supra note 20, at 91 (“Congress transformed the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate 
(OTA) from a function providing ‘internal’ administrative review to one providing quasi-adversarial 
review, with the effect of diluting the Service´s decisionmaking authority.”).  
 24. See IRS Publication 594, at 3 (“The IRS Collection Process. . . . We can attempt to collect 
your taxes up to 10 years from the date they were assessed.”). 
 25. Simon, supra note 19, at 798 (“Rather than concentrating power on particular “dangerous” 
subjects, actuarial technology changes the social context to make it immune to those subjects (who 
thus no longer need to be confined and controlled). Barricades are useless against a power that 
operates in the abstract space of statistical tables.”).  
 26. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 251 (“This other character, whom the penitentiary apparatus 
substitutes for the convicted offender, is the delinquent. The delinquent is to be distinguished from the 
offender by the fact that it is not so much his act as his life that is relevant in characterizing him.”).  
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The labeling of the tax “delinquent” as equivalent to the social 
delinquent, in Foucauldian terms, means that the punishment is not a 
rehabilitative process at all. In no way does the punishment of the tax 
delinquent fit the crime. A person that is delinquent to the IRS for just a 
few dollars can be forever labeled as a tax delinquent irrespective of 
whether the punishment constitutes an appropriate “exchange value” for 
the offense, thus rendering the delinquent subject to civil forfeiture and all 
the direct and indirect costs associated therewith.
27
 The idea of tax 
“punishment” is fundamentally absurd insofar as in many cases the tax 
delinquent is perfectly innocent of any wrongdoing and is merely subject 
to the (re)definition of “Truth” by the IRS as part of the audit process. Of 
course, such (re)definition of “Truth” is unknowable to anyone prior to the 
audit but particularly unknowable to the taxpayer who is then subjected to 
an extraordinary degree of retribution.  
The social delinquent, by definition, cannot be rehabilitated. This 
categorization of persons relates to a classification of the person as a 
delinquent and not a redress of the crime itself. As explained by Camille 
Nelson, “[A]s Foucault would posit, in the move from ‘offender’ to 
‘delinquent’ police become less concerned with acts and more concerned 
with identity.”28 Thus, society gives up on this class of citizens. Tax 
punishment is fundamentally about the assertion of power over the 
noncompliant taxpayer, a financial analog to the torture and execution of 
the deviant in the public square. The execution of a tax lien on any 
property of a tax delinquent accomplishes this objective directly.
29
 Further 
proof of the retributory purpose of IRS collection activity is that collection 
revenue is simply immaterial to total revenue.
30
  
The creation of such a delinquent social class represents an 
extraordinary fiscal policy disaster for the United States. The term “tax 
orphans” might be used for children of people wrongly classified as tax 
delinquents and represent an opportunity cost to society from such 
misclassification.
 
Tax orphans bear much of the incidence of the IRS tax 
 
 
 27. Id. at 244 (“The same goes for the duration of the punishment; it makes it possible to 
quantify the penalties exactly . . . but it also runs the risk of having no corrective value . . . The length 
of the penalty must not be a measurement of the ‘exchange value’ of the offence, it must be adjusted to 
the ‘useful’ transformation of the inmate during his term of imprisonment.”). 
 28. Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing Race and Mental Status, 
15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 63 (2010).  
 29. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 9 (“Now the scandal and the light are to be distributed 
differently; it is the conviction itself that marks the offender with the unequivocally negative sign”).  
 30. IRS Data Book, supra note 2, at 28 (indicating total audit adjustments are less than 1% of 
total collections). 
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enforcement activity. When the IRS reports (as it typically does) that it has 
happily collected a meager $1.9 billion in annual revenue through levy on 
“delinquents,”31 objective observers should ask: As the non-delinquent 
taxpaying members of society, ought we to cheer in celebration of the 
imposition of “justice” and “Truth” over the Foucauldian social 
delinquents or should we cry? Tax expenditures on all children were $114 
billion in 2013 and total expenditures were $464 billion in 2013.
32
 The 
$1.9 billion in IRS tax collection from the “tax delinquents” may not offset 
even the incremental amount of tax expenditures directly caused by its 
heavy-handed tax enforcement practices. But, to measure only the direct 
tax expenditures is clearly an underestimation. This article explains that 
IRS collection and enforcement activity further fails to achieve most of the 
goals of punishment itself, as set forth by Foucault in Discipline and 
Punish.  
I. ON THE IRS’S INQUISITORIAL VERSION OF “TRUTH” 
The modern tax system is embedded in American society. Thus, it is 
difficult, from within the panoptic machine, to imagine anything different 
from what actually exists. One might intuitively expect that the IRS would 
focus its enforcement efforts almost entirely on the taxpayers with the 
greatest revenue and, therefore, the greatest opportunity to take advantage 
of the tax laws. Instead, the IRS focuses its enforcement efforts almost 
exclusively on the persons with the least revenue and, therefore, the least 
opportunity to take advantage of the system.  
The explanation for this enforcement strategy relates at least in part to 
the IRS’s inquisitorial version of “Truth.” As a preliminary matter, the IRS 
does not operate to “[pluck,] as to procure the largest quantity of feathers 
with the least possible amount of squealing,” as was Jean Baptiste 
Colbert’s suggestion.33 This supports the general observation that the IRS 
is not primarily focused on the collection of revenue. Rather, the IRS sees 
itself in quasi-religious or chivalric terms. Camp explains: 
 
 
 31. Id.; Camp, supra note 21, at 72. 
 32. HEATHER HAHN ET AL., KIDS’ SHARE 2014: REPORT ON FEDERAL EXPENDITURES ON 
CHILDREN THROUGH 2013 11 (2014), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413215-Kids-
Share-2014.pdf. 
 33. David A. Wells, Taxation, in 3 CYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
AND OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 870, 871 (Lalor ed., Melbert B. Cary & Co., 
1884) (quoting Jean-Baptiste Colbert, finance minister of Louis XIV). 
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Undergirding the entire self-assessment regime is the idea that for 
every taxpayer, there exists a “true” tax liability. . . . Until 1998, the 
idea of a true tax liability was implicit in the Service’s mission 
statement, which stated that “[t]he purpose of the IRS is to collect 
the proper amount of tax revenue.”34  
But, of all the great minds engaged in tax law analysis around the world, 
few would agree that the tax laws can only be interpreted in black and 
white. The tax law is indeterminate both as a matter of law and as a matter 
of enforcement practice. The IRS accordingly operates along the lines of 
Don Quixote engaged in a proverbial crusade toward a romantic notion of 
the tax laws in modern society.
35
 This represents an organizational, 
teleological, systemic approach to tax enforcement that manifests in an 
extraordinary, institutionalized impracticality.  
Where Truth is not understood as relative to the aggregate amount of 
dollars collected, then an increase in teleological “Truth” is indeed more 
likely to be achieved against individual or small business taxpayers than 
large corporate taxpayers. As such, the IRS finds that it is better to direct 
its efforts against roughly 461,000 individual taxpayers per year claiming 
the earned income tax credit.
36
 The portion of low-income taxpayers 
audited as compared to high-income taxpayers audited is in a ratio of 
approximately 2-to-1.
37
 This increases the potential for IRS audits of low-
income persons that do not have any potential to raise enforcement 
revenue regardless of the actual outcome of the audit.  
Several commentators have raised the distinction between an 
adversarial and an inquisitorial legal process in relation to the practice of 
the IRS. King describes the distinction as follows: “Based upon 
philosophically based notions, the practice in adversarial countries reflects 
a pragmatic search for the truth; inquisitorial practice, to the contrary, 
 
 
 34. Camp, supra note 20, at 7–8; King, supra note 4, at 188 (“[T]he Truth sought by the 
inquisitorial judge consists mainly of a full reckoning of what happened in the crime so the proper 
sentence can be levied.”). See Bogenschneider supra note 5, at 252, 265 (“Factual indeterminacy in tax 
law is distinguishable from general legal indeterminacy. Indeterminate fact patterns typically arise 
where a finding of a separate body of law, such as corporate law, is be taken as a matter of fact for the 
application of tax law . . . there may be factual or legal indeterminacy on a particular transaction but 
also enforcement indeterminacy in that an aggressive tax transaction may never be challenged.”). 
 36. Miguel De Cervantes, Don Quixote (Edith Grossman trans., Harper Collins 2003). 
 36. IRS, supra note 2, at 27. 
 37. Id.; Nelson, supra note 28, at 5960 (“Disciplinarians therefore create schemas of coercion 
that tend to be focused disparately on some communities and individuals than upon others. Thus only 
some people are subject to such ‘strict subjection,’ and not all bodies are disciplined equally. Like 
other disciplinarians, police order ‘human multiplicities’ based upon the varied identities of individuals 
in society.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
   
 
 
 
 
 
68 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 8:59 
 
 
 
 
reflects its philosophical tradition in its drive to discover an absolute 
Truth.”38 Specifically as to the tax law, Camp argues that the inquisitorial 
legal system is based on an expanded role of the decision maker and a 
preference for absolute truth.
39
 In general, the Continental European 
tradition adopts a more inquisitorial approach than the United States. The 
missing adversarial nature of an IRS proceeding is particularly apparent 
under the legal tradition of the United States with its focus on individual 
rights. As explained by King: “In the United States, a premium is placed 
on individual rights . . . This is significantly different from the situation in 
inquisitorial, civil-law countries, where the judge applies the law with a 
supposed clear, settled meaning.”40 King concludes: “In this respect, the 
pragmatic truth outlook can be labeled deontological from a Truth-as-good 
standpoint. In the American adversarial process, the good outcome can 
derive only from a right process; there is no good outcome . . . if the 
process . . . is not followed.”41 
Camp goes on to conclude that the inquisitorial tax process is 
fundamentally “un-American.”42 This may be true. However, this 
conclusion fails to understand that the inquisitorial legal system sets out 
first and foremost to enlighten society. King explains as follows: 
The Continental Inquisitorial Tradition. The essential notions that 
arise from this philosophical tradition are that the state is the 
primary actor and the individual is the primary recipient of the 
action. It is the job of the society to enlighten and shape its 
members, so it should be trusted to do so. A great deference, then, 
must be given to the state in conducting its activities for the benefit 
of its constituent individuals; after all, that is what the state was 
founded to do. This means its methods, if within reason, cannot be 
questioned as long as it achieves the goal of enlightenment.
43
 
Thus, the outcome of any audit is not that the state collects some particular 
amount of money. The fundamental idea is that the citizen is enlightened 
about what the IRS determined the “Truth” to be. The conclusion is that 
the IRS determined the “Truth” as it was all along, often reversing any 
misguided ideas about the tax laws along the way.  
 
 
 38. King, supra note 4, at 230. 
 39. Camp, supra note 20, at 1819. 
 40. King, supra note 4, at 18992. 
 41. Id. at 189. 
 42. Camp, supra note 20, at 17. 
 43. King, supra note 4, at 194. 
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The jurisprudential observation is simply that the IRS operates as the 
Don Quixote-inspired lawgiver, dispensing its “Truth” about the tax laws 
to the taxpayers of the United States. Any tax practitioner can attest to the 
extraordinary difficulty that arises in tax practice when a taxpayer 
challenges the administrative ruling of the IRS in federal court and 
prevails. The IRS does not automatically acquiesce to the reversal of its 
judgment by a federal court as precedent for other taxpayers. Indeed, the 
IRS goes on with its version of the “Truth,” even when the adversarial 
legal process in the United States concludes to the contrary. Two primary 
examples are the Cohan rule regarding the documentation of business 
expenses
44
 and the Zellerbach rule relating to the statute of limitations on 
the filing of an amended return.
45
  
II. FOUCAULT’S DISCIPLINE & PUNISH AS APPLIED TO TAX 
JURISPRUDENCE 
In effect the offence opposes an individual to the entire social 
body. . . . It is an unequal struggle: on one side are all the forces, all 
the power, all the rights. . . . [T]he offender becomes the common 
enemy. Indeed, he is worse than an enemy, for it is from within 
society that he delivers his blows—he is nothing less than a traitor, 
a “monster”. How could society not have an absolute right over 
him? How could it not demand, quite simply, his elimination?
46
 
The vocabulary used by Foucault in relation to social institutions is 
directly analogous to the law of taxation. The IRS uses “examination” to 
identify the “delinquent.”47 Furthermore, the idea of taxation as power is 
well established in American jurisprudence.
48
 The social institutions 
empowered with the enforcement of taxation are inherently powerful. 
Bruce Arrigo describes the power of social institutions as follows: 
 
 
 44. See Cohan v. Comm’r, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 45. See Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 172 (1934). 
 46. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 90.  
 47. Id. at 184 (“The examination. The examination combines the techniques of an observing 
hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it 
possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which 
one differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of discipline, the 
examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the 
experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth.”). 
 48. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (“[T]he power to tax involves the power to 
destroy”). 
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Foucault’s position that power—embedded within and 
communicated through doctrinal texts—produces, led him to assert 
that the proliferation and dissemination of these narratives operate 
as discursive mechanisms of social control, surveillance, and 
disciplining. More problematic, however, were the punitive effects 
of these narratives, effects experienced both materially and 
existentially.
49
  
The origin of punishment is the exercise of power by Foucault’s 
“Prince.”50 In a public display, the prince remedies the crime against a 
sovereign power by inflicting punishment upon the body of the criminal. 
But, upon the arrival of the more modern state, the focus changes from a 
punishment levied on the body of the wrongdoer to a correction of the 
will.
51
 Halewood explains as follows: “[I]n liberalism, the will is essential 
and the body is surplus; yet, the body is essential to the construction of 
liberalism’s account of rights—the unspoken referent from which the 
autonomous will is abstracted and with which it is contrasted.”52 Liberal 
society is thus concerned not only with the body but also the will. Foucault 
uses the term “soul,” which does not mean a religious “soul” but refers to 
a civil soul of a person representing the goodwill to participate as a citizen 
within society.
53
 
Although Foucault mentions taxation only once in Discipline and 
Punish, the overall implications are quite significant. Foucault explains as 
follows: 
[O]ne can live only from the product of one’s labour, through the 
practice of a profession or from the product of the labour of others, 
by thieving; but, although the prison did not force offenders to 
 
 
 49. Bruce A. Arrigo, Madness, Citizenship, and Social Justice: On the Ethics of the Shadow and 
the Ultramodern, 23 LAW & LITERATURE 405, 417 (2011).  
 50. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 47 (“Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the 
sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of the sovereign; it attacks him 
physically, since the force of the law is the force of the prince.”). 
 51. Id. at 19 (“‘What would be the best way of rehabilitating him’? A whole set of assessing, 
diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgements concerning the criminal have become lodged in the 
framework of penal judgement. Another truth has penetrated the truth that was required by the legal 
machinery; a truth which, entangled with the first, has turned the assertion of guilt into a strange 
scientifico-juridical complex.”).  
 52. Peter Halewood, Law´s Bodies: Disembodiment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 
81 IOWA L. REV. 1331, 1378 (1996). 
 53. Arrigo, supra note 49, at 418 (“Foucault’s notion of the “soul” refers to the internalization of 
disciplinary knowledge/truth, absent the need for external mechanisms of restraint or coercion (e.g., 
torture, banishment, ostracism, or other corrective action). This is the moment at which the individual 
is thoroughly immersed in the language and logic of the communicative system in use.”). 
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work, it seems to have reintroduced into its very institution and, 
obliquely, by means of taxation, this levying by some on the labour 
of others: The question of idleness is the same as in society; it is 
from the labour of others that the convicts live, if they do not exist 
from their own labour. The labour by which the convict contributes 
to his own needs turns the thief into a docile worker.
54
 
Thus, society itself must be concerned with tax crimes, because they 
represent an indirect crime against those that pay taxes. The key point is 
that the purpose of the punitive institution must now be to reform the 
“lazy” into productive workers to prevent indirect thievery from the 
working class.
55
 As the regulatory institution for the taxing power is the 
IRS, one might thus expect that the IRS tax enforcement policy would be 
designed in every respect to create productive workers.
56
 In reality, 
however, the IRS often achieves just the opposite.  
III. STANDARDS OF NORMATIVITY AND THE DELINQUENT TAXPAYER 
[T]he delinquent is a criminal element, a type of person who must 
constantly be watched and ultimately punished as he falls outside 
the pact, disqualifies himself as a citizen and emerges, bearing 
within him as it were, a wild fragment of nature; he appears as a 
villain, a monster, a madman, perhaps, a sick and, before long, 
“abnormal” individual.57 
The filing of the tax return is traditionally viewed as a self-assessment 
of tax liability in a voluntary tax system.
58
 If the IRS questions the self-
assessment by the taxpayer, it may conduct an audit and then issue an 
 
 
 54. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. Snider, supra note 12, at 94 (“However, linking productivity, or the lack thereof, to 
criminality is new. Transforming the unproductive employee into the criminal is significant. Not that 
law has ever been absent from the workplace; rather, employment and contract law have always 
focused on regularizing the employee-employer relationship. Still, it is significant because calling 
something “criminal” is an ideological and moral claim.”).  
 56. Arrigo, supra note 49, at 417 (“In the modernist framework, the apparatuses of power and 
domination are built around regulatory institutions (e.g., the legal, the psychiatric, the penal, and the 
medical). These apparatuses promote particularized regimes of knowledge/truth whose effect is the 
panoptic inspection, disciplining, and normalization of the subject.”). 
 57. Nelson, supra note 28, at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58. Camp, supra note 20, at 5 (“Like many clichés, however, ‘voluntary self-assessment’ is true 
in a more significant sense than it is false. The tax determination process ultimately rests on taxpayers 
disclosing their financial affairs and paying what they owe—through withholding or otherwise—
without overt government compulsion.”).  
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assessment.
59
 The IRS assessment functions as a civil judgment against the 
taxpayer.
60
 The full details of administrative process before the IRS are 
nicely explained by Camp.
61
 If the taxpayer disagrees with the IRS 
assessment, he or she may file for relief in tax court or federal district 
court (if the tax liability is pre-paid), but, in any case, the taxpayer will 
bear the burden of proof. This is the sole procedure for small businesses 
and individual taxpayers. Of course, large corporations are afforded not 
only the rights described here but also the special rights of substantive, 
procedural, and “creative” due process as described earlier. 
An alternative view of the administrative tax filing process is illustrated 
by Foucault. In the alternative view, the IRS agency operates as a social 
institution to “normalize” taxpayers. As explained by Kyle Kirkup:  
Normalizing judgment . . . involves constant valuation and 
comparison among and between subjects. A rule or “norm” is 
constructed that functions as a “minimal threshold . . . ,” and with 
this minimal threshold comes an incentive for subjects to conform: 
those who fail to conform constantly risk being codified as part of 
the “abnormal” or “shameful” class.62  
The filing of the tax return is essentially a test of normalcy.
63
 The IRS 
audit is referred to by the IRS as an “examination,” a term that Foucault 
also uses.
64
 The audit is thus effectively the “grading” of a test to 
 
 
 59. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administrative State, 84 IND. L.J. 
57, 62 (2009) (“An assessment marks the end of one process—tax determination—and the beginning 
of another—administrative tax collection. A proper assessment enables the tax lien created by § 6321 
to arise. It allows the IRS to begin seizing taxpayer property under its levy authority in § 6331. Finally, 
and most critically, a proper assessment opens up the § 6502 collection period, which gives the IRS a 
whopping ten years to collect the tax administratively.”). 
 60. Camp, supra note 20, at 2021 (“Assessments serve as the Service’s administrative judgment 
of what taxes a taxpayer owes the government. A properly recorded assessment is the functional 
equivalent of a judgment against the taxpayer.”).  
 61. Camp, supra note 59, at 64 (“Once a taxpayer receives the Notice of Deficiency, I.R.C. 
§ 6213 allows the taxpayer (generally) ninety days to seek review of the liability determination from a 
neutral third-party tribunal. Only after the ninety days (or the conclusion of the Tax Court case if the 
taxpayer timely petitions for review) may the IRS assess.”).  
 62. Kyle Kirkup, Indocile Bodies: Gender Identity and Strip Searches in Canadian Criminal 
Law, 24 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 107, 120 (2009). 
 63. Andrew Wasicek, Mental Illness and Crime: Envisioning a Public Health Strategy and 
Reimagining Mental Health Courts, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. (2012) (“Foucault’s argument that prisons, 
asylums, factories, and schools are institutions that act as tools of capitalist dominance and 
subordination. These tools act as more “humanized” forms of control by abandoning “savage corporal 
brutality,” but they are still “inextricably tied up with . . . ideology” that seeks to subordinate and 
transform subjects for its own purposes.”).  
 64. IRM 4.2 (Apr. 23, 2014). 
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determine whether a taxpayer meets the standard of normalcy. Foucault 
describes the examination process as follows: 
The procedures of examination were accompanied at the same time 
by a system of intense registration and of documentary 
accumulation. A “power of writing” was constituted as an essential 
part in the mechanisms of discipline. On many points, it was 
modeled on the traditional methods of administrative 
documentation, though with particular techniques and important 
innovations.
65
 
In order for the IRS agent to assess normalcy, a set of writings or 
codification is required—i.e., Internal Revenue Code, Treasury 
Regulations, even the Internal Revenue Manual. Kirkup explains as 
follows: 
The proliferation of writings on so-called abnormal subjects 
transforms each individual examination into a “case,” one that is 
examined from every possible angle by those who sit in hegemonic 
positions of power. When the individual becomes a case, he or she 
can be described, judged, measured, compared with others. Further, 
once made visible, the “cased” individual can begin to be trained or 
corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc. Thus the 
examination becomes another tool in the discipline and subjection 
of bodies, especially those bodies that disrupt or otherwise threaten 
“norms.”66 
Once formalized, the writings then become an independent standard of 
normality that does not depend on any one person, such as a monarch, for 
clarification. To Foucault, this written standard is in part the transition to a 
technological society.  
The IRS uses technological means as part of the examination process. 
That is, the IRS applies statistical and actuarial techniques to determine 
whether the taxpayer meets the standard of normalcy.
67
 IRS computers 
now operate in lieu of human judgment in order to identify the “abnormal” 
taxpayer. The computer system creates the assessment and the collection 
 
 
 65. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 189. 
 66. Kirkup, supra note 62, at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Simon, supra note 19, at 773 (“Actuarial practices are emerging as a dominant force because 
they further intensify the effectiveness of power set into motion by the rise of the disciplines. It is not, 
however, simply a question of better technology. The emergence of actuarial practices also marks 
change in the social environment in which power must be exercised.”).  
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notice, and the human operator of the system serves only to make sure the 
computer is operating effectively. As explained by Davis, “Foucault’s 
theories explain that when . . . the Tax Court, or the IRS classify behavior 
or biological processes as normal or natural, they are engaged in an 
exercise of power which is culturally mediated.”68 In other words, if the 
human operator re-evaluated the computer´s work, it might become more 
likely that a particular taxpayer (i.e., a political opponent) would be 
deemed to be “abnormal” on further review. Thus, the concern is, at least 
in part, that a taxpayer could be exposed as “abnormal” with incremental 
scrutiny.  
Foucault further posited a societal process of defining the “normal” 
taxpayer. However, some portion of society must be judged as not normal 
thus creating the tax “delinquent.” Society must then determine how to 
deal with the delinquent class. According to Foucault, societal institutions, 
including the IRS and its collections process that has been set up to deal 
with the tax “delinquents,” are very much part of society and not separate 
from it. More specifically, the IRS collection procedure sets and creates 
the values of modern society.  
IV. PRIVACY RIGHTS, SURVEILLANCE, AND THE “ALL-SEEING-EYE” OF 
THE IRS 
The key aspect of the Panopticon was the central watch guard 
tower, which was designed with blackened windows that allowed 
the guards to see out, but did not allow the prisoners to see in. This 
created a situation of perfect surveillance and perfect control; the 
prisoners had no idea at any given time whether the guards were 
watching or even whether the guards were in the tower at all.
69
 
Many persons are familiar with the “all-seeing eye” emblazoned on the 
top of the pyramid on the back of the one-dollar bill. The true irony is that 
the United States has now achieved what amounts to a technological “all-
seeing eye” over its taxpayers through the computer systems of the IRS. 
Most of the tax administration activities of the IRS are automated, 
including both the assessment and collection processes.
70
 However, Camp 
 
 
 68. Tessa Davis, Reproducing Value: How Tax Law Differentially Values Fertility, Sexuality & 
Marriage, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1, 26–27 (2012). 
 69. Marcy Peek, The Observer and the Observed: Re-imagining Privacy Dichotomies in 
Information Privacy Law, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 51 (2009).  
 70. Camp, supra note 59, at 70–71 (“If the taxpayer does not respond, or cannot resolve the 
account at the Notice stage, the account moves to the Automated Collection System (ACS) stage. As 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol8/iss1/3
   
 
 
 
 
 
2015] FOUCAULT AND TAX JURISPRUDENCE 75 
 
 
 
 
explains that the higher the rank of an employee within the IRS 
bureaucracy the greater the individual discretion to deviate from the 
computer system or the Internal Revenue Manual.
71
 
Foucault describes surveillance generally in terms of the “gaze.” The 
classic example of a disciplinary gaze is in reference to Bentham´s 
architectural structure: the Panopticon.
72
 Foucault describes Bentham´s 
Panopticon as follows: 
[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this 
tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of 
the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which 
extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, 
one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the 
other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end 
to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a 
central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a 
condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.
73
 
Surveillance enhances discipline mechanisms within social institutions. 
Persons under surveillance follow the rules by their own cognition, 
because “[i]n a true panoptic system, the inmates [are] confined by an 
invisible jailor—subdued into docile submission by his indistinguishable 
gaze.”74 The gaze is not solely a penal mechanism; it also pervades schools 
and tax enforcement. Foucault explains surveillance in the following way: 
 
 
its name implies, ACS is also automated; it too operates from campuses. This is the stage where the 
IRS first sends out levies and files NFTLs. Again, I emphasize that this work is done mainly by 
computer systems with little human intervention. Computers decide which accounts get priority in 
processing. Computers interact with other computers to identify types and locations of taxpayer assets 
(such as employer name, bank accounts, etc.), and computer algorithms determine the most likely levy 
sources. The CDP Notices required by § 6320 and § 6330 (informing taxpayers of their rights to a 
Collection Due Process hearing, which I explain below) are automatically issued by computer on form 
letter LT11, with no human intervention.”). 
 71. Id. at 70 (“IRS employees ‘in’ or ‘at’ the campuses rely heavily on the aggregate decisions 
reflected in the rules and instructions given to them in that capacious compendium, the Internal 
Revenue Manual (IRM). The IRM instructs employees how to process almost any situation they 
encounter and provides rules for interacting with taxpayers and interfacing with the computers. IRS 
employees on the campuses are much more bound by rules than are the IRS employees in the field. As 
is typical in bureaucracies, discretion widens as an employee moves up the hierarchy.”). 
 72. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 214 (“And, in order to be exercised, this power had to be given 
the instrument of permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance, capable of making all visible, as 
long as it could itself remain invisible. It had to be like a faceless gaze that transformed the whole 
social body into a field of perception: thousands of eyes posted everywhere, mobile attentions ever on 
the alert”). 
 73. Id. at 200. 
 74. Patricia A. Powers, Note, Making a Spectacle of Panopticism: A Theoretical Evaluation of 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1049, 1084 (2004).  
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The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a 
single gaze to see everything constantly. A central point would be 
both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of 
convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that 
nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would 
be turned.
75
 
The modern statistical and actuarial processes of the IRS are far more 
advanced than the “gaze” envisioned by Foucault. The modern 
surveillance capabilities of the IRS are truly extraordinary. Although the 
algorithm is a secret, the IRS computer not only cross-references the 
informational tax returns with the actual tax returns but also performs an 
evaluative function to assess the quantum of itemized deductions relative 
to income. This forms the basis for the modern surveillance society.
76
 As 
explained by Cohen: “These observations, which have obvious application 
to a wide variety of statistical and actuarial practices performed in both 
government and private sectors, have served as the foundation for 
elaboration of the work of modern ‘surveillance societies.’”77 
However, the current version of IRS surveillance differs from 
Bentham’s vision of the Panopticon in at least one significant way. The 
Panopticon was conceived with the idea of public access to the social 
disciplinary institution: “The public would be admitted to the panoptic 
institution. While inspecting the prisoners, the public would also provide 
another control function within the institution—keeping the inspectors in 
line through indirect surveillance of their work.”78 However, as it currently 
stands, the public has no access to IRS processes or records, which are 
held as a carefully guarded secret. The IRS operates to maintain the 
secrecy of tax records under federal law and not to allow public 
examination of tax records. Joseph Darby argues that the IRS asks for a 
great deal of information with the promise to hold it in strict confidence: 
“[T]he justifiable expectation of the taxpayer that the rather extensive 
information about his personal and financial life that he is required under 
 
 
 75. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 173. 
 76. Id. at 201 (“In view of this, Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and 
unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central 
tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being 
looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so.”).  
 77. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 186 
(2008).  
 78. Powers, supra note 74, at 1084. 
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threat of fine or imprisonment to furnish to the tax authorities will be held 
by them in confidence.”79 Yet, as Darby explains: 
The taxpayer’s right to the confidentiality of information in the files 
of the tax collector is founded not on the U.S. Constitution, nor on 
the common law, but rather on Section 6103 of the Internal 
Revenue Code. This statute establishes a principle of 
confidentiality, qualified by numerous exceptions designed to assist 
governmental institutions in the performance of their assigned 
duties.
80
 
Thus, the individual U.S. citizen does not have the right to maintain an 
inspecting “gaze” over the tax records of other U.S. taxpayers.  
An alternative version of the “gaze” in the tax system would be to 
allow the public to perform the role of the IRS by making tax filings 
public. The United States did not historically protect tax filings and neither 
do many other nations. As fully explained by Likhovski, “what seems 
natural to some—the ‘right’ of taxpayers not to have their income tax 
information revealed to fellow taxpayers—is actually the outcome of a 
specific historical trajectory.”81 A very simple means to enforce the tax 
laws might be to reduce the amount of information disclosed in the tax 
return process, all while making such filings public. As Foucault 
explained, “[a] secret punishment is a punishment half wasted. This 
approach would also facilitate the decentralization of observational power 
away from the IRS and to the American public and allow the public 
“gaze” to disinfect the tax filings, particularly those of publicly traded 
corporate taxpayers.
82
 
For the small business taxpayer, the omnipresent gaze of the IRS 
certainly affects behavior, perhaps not always to the benefit of society. 
“[H]uman beings react differently and engage in a virtual ‘theatre’ when 
they believe they are being observed.”83 At a minimum, honest individual 
and small business taxpayers go to great lengths to create detailed tax 
records at the prospect of IRS examination. This is true even where the 
taxpayer could just as easily create an estimate of the tax due, rather than 
 
 
 79. Joseph J. Darby, Confidentiality and the Law of Taxation, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 577, 577 
(1998).  
 80. Id. at 587. 
 81. Assaf Likhovski, Chasing Ghosts: On Writing Cultural Histories of Tax Law, 1 UC IRVINE 
L. REV. 843, 871–72 (2011).  
 82. Powers, supra note 74, at 1061 (“Panopticism, unlike forms of spectacle punishment, does 
not centralize power in one person. Instead, power is distributed among the many.”). 
 83. Peek, supra note 69, at 62.  
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engage in the theatrical presentation required by the IRS on the tax 
return.
84
 The approximate $10 billion annual budget of the IRS is 
exceeded by a ratio of 2:1 on the tax compliance expenditures of 
individual and small business taxpayers.
85
  
V. TAX DELINQUENCY AND “HOMO OECONOMICUS” 
[T]he maxim, “he who wants to live must work”, would be clearly 
revealed. Work would be compulsory, but so too would be 
remuneration, which enables the prisoner to improve his lot during 
and after detention. . . . This reconstruction of homo oeconomicus 
excluded the use of penalties that were too short—this would 
prevent the acquisition of habits and skills of work—or too long—
which would make any apprenticeship useless.
86
 
The specific intent of Congress in designing the tax laws is distinct 
from the intent of the IRS, which has been charged with the enforcement 
of the tax laws. Indeed, the teleological objectives of the IRS are 
potentially preclusive against Congress´ more practical aims. The policy 
goals of Congress in designing the tax laws reflect a dual purpose. The 
first goal appears to be to raise revenue consistent with the tax laws. The 
second goal appears to be to reform the tax cheater into a citizen that will 
be more willing to contribute to society, in compliance with societal rules. 
The reformatory goal of punishment thus raises Foucault’s conception of 
enforcement toward what might be termed taxpayer “discipline.” Congress 
certainly envisions the enforcement of Foucauldian-style discipline upon 
noncompliant taxpayers.
87
 
Yet, perhaps of major significance to the analysis here, at no point does 
Congress charge the IRS to establish an absolute “Truth” designed to 
create a social class of tax delinquents, who may be in violation thereof. 
Rather, Congress specifically sought to limit the IRS’ enforcement 
 
 
 84. See Assaf Likhovski, “Training in Citizenship”: Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 665, 683 (2007) (“Surveillance is related to self-policing, which lessens the need of the 
state (and nonstate institutions) to constantly monitor their subjects.”). 
 85. Tax Foundation statistics, available at http://taxfoundation.org/blog/cost-tax-compliance. 
 86. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 122. 
 87. Id. (“‘The man who does not find his subsistence must be made to desire to procure it for 
himself by work; he is offered it by supervision and discipline; in a sense, he is forced to acquire he is 
then tempted by the bait of gain; corrected in his morals, accustomed to work, his anxiety aroused by 
the little money he has kept for his release,’ he has learned a trade ‘that will guarantee a subsistence 
without danger.”). 
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practices.
88
 This teleological result is entirely the product of the IRS. The 
IRS undertakes this quest for “Truth” just as Cervantes describes Don 
Quixote seeking to enforce an imaginary version of chivalry into the 
world. The tax penalties set by Congress are not intended to be the 
penalties of a vengeful medieval wrath against the body of the peasant 
taxpayer.
89
 Only the IRS holds the view that it, alone, is the origin of 
“Truth” in the tax laws.90 It is from this teleological premise that the IRS 
justifies the extraordinary levy and collection powers that destroy the lives 
of so many Americans. And, it is from this premise that the IRS 
effectively exempts large corporations and their “well-educated” 
management teams from any meaningful audit or examination in the 
enforcement of the tax laws. 
Foucault identifies the social institution of the prison as designed to 
create a “homo oeconomicus” in the form of a worker with a more “docile 
body.”91 The pejorative nomenclature indicates that Foucault may hold the 
attempted re-characterization of the “soul” of mankind in purely economic 
terms of disdain.
 
But, any debate as to whether the IRS, as an 
administrative agency, ought to be used as a means to create a more 
disciplined form of worker for the benefit of capitalist industry is a 
question for the Congress.
92
 But, the issue is at this point moot.
93
 If 
 
 
 88. Camp, supra note 59, at 76 (“The Conference Committee report instructs the IRS to create a 
new category of persons eligible to compromise their liabilities: those whose classification as can’t-
pay (through the act of compromising the liability) would ‘promote effective tax administration’ 
because of ‘factors such as equity, hardship, and public policy.’”). 
 89. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 90 (“The right to punish has been shifted from the vengeance of 
the sovereign to the defence of society. But it now finds itself recombined with elements so strong that 
it becomes almost more to be feared. The malefactor has been saved from a threat that is by its very 
nature excessive, but he is exposed to a penalty that seems to be without bounds. It is a return to a 
terrible ‘super-power’. It brings with it the need to establish a principle of moderation for the power of 
punishment.”).  
 90. Camp, supra note 20, at 83 (“For example, if determining one’s tax liability becomes so 
complicated that reasonable minds can disagree on the “proper” tax, then it becomes difficult to 
maintain there is a “proper” tax at all. Tax liabilities become contingent on circumstances, the most 
important being the identity of the decisionmaker.”).  
 91. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 136 (“A body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed 
and improved.”). 
 92. Id. at 153 (“One is as far as possible from those forms of subjection that demanded of the 
body only signs or products, forms of expression or the result of labour. The regulation imposed by 
power is at the same time the law of construction of the operation. Thus disciplinary power appears to 
have the function not so much of deduction as of synthesis, not so much of exploitation of the product 
as of coercive link with the apparatus of production.”). 
 93. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 221 (“In fact, the two processes—the accumulation of men and 
the accumulation of capital—cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the 
problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both 
sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of 
men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
   
 
 
 
 
 
80 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 8:59 
 
 
 
 
Congress intended to empower the IRS to encourage a more docile form 
of worker along the lines of “homo oeconomicus,” then the IRS has 
declined to adopt such an approach as part of its enforcement practices 
against low-income taxpayers.  
VI. THE FATE OF THE TAX DELINQUENT: THE “PHILADELPHIA”-STYLE 
PRISON WITHOUT WALLS 
Then came the Philadelphia model. This was no doubt the most 
famous because it was associated in people’s minds with the 
political innovations of the American system and also because it 
was not, like the others, doomed to immediate failure and 
abandonment . . . [T]he prisoners were also rewarded individually 
as a way of reinserting them morally and materially into the strict 
world of the economy; by keeping the prisoners “constantly 
employed on productive works, they were able to defray the 
expenses of the prison, they were not left idle and they were able to 
save a little money for the time when their captivity would cease”.94 
On the one hand, the Congressional policy objectives imply a 
reformative element.
95
 That is, the taxpayer must accept the taxing 
authority of the state and comply. If she does, then she ought to be 
welcomed back into society without being branded a criminal. The 
reformative idea is that, even as a tax offender, the person still has value to 
society as a potential worker or taxpayer. Congress does not appear 
interested in branding individuals as a form of social outcast merely from 
a tax infraction.  
On the other hand, the IRS teleological policy objectives are not 
reformatory. In the quest for absolute “Truth,” the IRS is quite willing and 
able to brand individuals as delinquent. This accomplishes three policy 
objectives for the IRS not contemplated by Congress. First, the labeling 
establishes that the IRS is able to find “Truth” in the tax laws. This 
 
 
 94. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 123–24. 
 95. Assaf Likhovski, supra note 84, at 666–67 (“Tranter suggested that the state deal with 
‘curable evaders’ by appealing to their sense of patriotism; by educating them in the basics of ‘civics’; 
by initiating public relations campaigns; by utilizing the services of teachers, accountants, and the 
clergy; and by declaring tax amnesties. As for ‘incurable’ tax evaders, Tranter had the following 
suggestion: ‘So far evasion is not a certifiable form of insanity nor are there yet mental hospitals which 
admit to their wards for kleptomaniacs those convicted of taxation frauds. We segregate those 
demonstrably and incurably anti-social in a physical sense, such as confirmed criminals, and those 
anti-social in a mental sense, such as lunatics and idiots, but not yet those anti-social in an economic 
sense.’”) (citations omitted). 
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represents an institutional self-affirmation for the IRS of its own 
groupthink. Second, the labeling allows the IRS to justify the levy of 
property against the delinquent taxpayer over an extended period of time. 
This represents a psychological justification for creditor behavior that 
would otherwise be considered wrong if applied to a class of law-abiding 
citizens.
96
 Third, the branding of taxpayers is an exercise of power directly 
over other persons.
97
 Any tax practitioner involved in an IRS audit can 
attest to the “power trip” of some tax auditors within the IRS.  
The culmination of the IRS assessment and collections process creates 
a tax “delinquent” who owes the IRS a de minimis amount of money. The 
most common form of tax delinquency in my experience is an improper 
claim of the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) based on a 
misunderstanding of the extraordinarily technical eligibility rules.
98
 The 
hypocrisy of taxing the wages of the working poor at confiscatory rates 
and attempting to reverse the taxes with the EITC ought to be readily 
apparent to all concerned.
99
 For low-income persons, it may have been 
preferable if Congress had never implemented the EITC in the first place.
 
The effect of a tax levy upon a person wrongly claiming the EITC is 
perhaps best explained by Foucault: “The wages of penal labour do not 
reward production; they function as a motive and measure of individual 
transformation: it is a legal fiction, since it does not represent the ‘free’ 
granting of labour power, but an artifice that is presumed to be effective in 
the techniques of correction.”100 
The tax delinquent often becomes aware of an IRS collection process 
when his or her bank account or wages are garnished (often, the IRS 
notices are mailed to a former address where the tax delinquent was a 
 
 
 96. Camp, supra note 20, at 26–27 (“Unlike private creditors, the Service could generally collect 
the tax without judicial aid, choosing what assets to seize or, if the liability were joint, which taxpayer 
to collect from. Under section 6323 it could file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien which would take 
priority over all but a very few favored creditors. Under section 6331 it could seize or levy first, then 
adjudicate ownership later. Indeed, the Service ‘pursued the administrative practice . . . of seizing any 
property found in the possession, custody or control of the person against whom the tax had been 
imposed.’”).  
 97. See generally Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Will to Tax Avoidance: Nietzsche and Libertarian 
Jurisprudence, [2014] J. JURISPRUDENCE 321, 323 (“Rather, to Libertarians the activity of tax 
avoidance represents a more fundamental Will to Power by the individual against the state, and also a 
display of power over other regular, wage-earning, perhaps “lesser” taxpayers. This then describes the 
Will to Power by the Libertarian over income taxes as a fundamental aspect of tax policy.”). 
 98. 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2011); Leslie Book, EITC Noncompliance: What We Don´t Know Can Hurt 
Them, 99 TAX NOTES 1821, 1821 (2003).  
 99. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-
Size Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301 (2004); Anne L. Alstott, The Earned 
Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995).  
 100. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 243. 
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lessee and, therefore, the tax delinquent may not have received the IRS 
notice in a timely fashion). At that point, the tax delinquent becomes 
unable to pay other bills over which the IRS levy has prioritized itself. The 
tax delinquent thus becomes subject to other creditor claims. Thus, the 
question arises as to whether the tax delinquent ought to continue working 
in a low-wage position while subject to IRS levy. The answer is usually 
“no;” the taxpayer finds the position to be hopeless and stops actively 
working to avoid the IRS levy. Notably, in my experience, this result 
occurs even where the taxpayer would be better off by continuing to work 
and paying off the creditors over a period of time. This simply is not 
human nature. As such, the tax delinquent generally arrives at the doorstep 
of the state and local government as a completely penniless ward of the 
state. In applications for food stamps and subsidized housing, the state 
government will check for any accumulated assets but, of course, will find 
none as the IRS has taken any assets the taxpayer might otherwise have 
enjoyed. Upon arrival at the doorstep of the state for social support, 
Foucault observes: “Delinquency is the vengeance of the prison on justice. 
It is a revenge formidable enough to leave the judge speechless.”101 
From a Foucauldian perspective, the consequences for a modern tax 
“delinquent” should be compared with other possible punishments. The 
tax delinquent is not subject to enclosure in a confined space.
102
 The tax 
delinquent is not forced to hard labor.
103
 Rather, here the punishment 
actually encourages the taxpayer not to work, whereas she had an 
incentive to work prior to the IRS’ collection efforts. In fact, only low-
income, but working, taxpayers are eligible for the EITC. So, by 
definition, the IRS’s collection efforts are focused on reclassifying the 
working poor into a new class of tax “delinquents,” without providing an 
incentive to work. The tax “delinquent” is effectively subjected to public 
reprimand, fines, civil assessments, and seizure of assets. The tax 
“delinquent” is ostracized, and becomes unwilling to work or contribute to 
society. Because wages are subject to extraordinarily high rates of taxation 
in any case,
104
 it is very unlikely that the IRS will collect more net revenue 
by garnishing the bank accounts of the working poor than simply by 
continuing to withhold taxes and allowing the person to work. In any case, 
 
 
 101. Id. at 255. 
 102. Id. at 141. 
 103. Id. at 149. 
 104. See Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Effective Tax Rate of U.S. Persons by Income Level, 145 
TAX NOTES 117, 118 (2014) (calculating an “American Dream” effective tax rate as a tax rate 
applicable to a person with education and health care expense).  
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the outcome is that the tax delinquent is in a form of financial prison to 
which she cannot escape. When the tax “delinquent” drops out of society, 
it is hardly an exaggeration to describe this as the financial “execution” of 
the working poor in American society. This outcome represents Foucault’s 
Philadelphia-style prison for tax delinquents in modern America but 
without walls or any possibility of reformation or the rejoining of society.  
VII. “SINS” OF THE TAXPAYER 
The IRS automated computer system was created during the 1960s.
105
 
This computer system came to be a form of an actualized “god” in terms 
of its surveillance capability; such “god” is now very real and omnipresent 
in the lives of Americans. The “god”-like system functions autonomously 
in both the tax assessment and collections processes. Any human beings at 
the IRS are required primarily to watch over the operation of the system. 
How exactly the IRS computer system functions remains a carefully 
guarded secret. But, upon any sin, even a math error, the taxpayer receives 
a notification automatically, as if merely to prove the “god’s” very 
existence. The IRS computer system now automatically issues an 
assessment or violation notice on behalf of the IRS. If the taxpayer 
“confesses” and pays the assessment plus a penalty, then the taxpayer 
achieves atonement before the “god.” If the taxpayer refuses to “confess,” 
then the IRS computer issues an automatic collection notice. This 
collection notice then authorizes the IRS revenue agent to begin the 
audit—the “torture” of the taxpayer. If the taxpayer is innocent, then she 
might ultimately withstand such torture.
106
  
In most cases, the will of the computer is inscrutable and unknowable 
to the subject taxpayers. The “god” is sometimes pleased. In that case, the 
taxpayer receives a surprise check. The “god” is sometimes displeased. In 
that case, the taxpayer receives a surprise assessment. Most people 
implicitly believe in a vengeful IRS, because the surprises are usually 
negative. Indeed, the “god” physically manifests in the arrival of actual 
letters in the mailbox. We therefore presume that the “god” exists. Yet, 
there are non-believers in modern society. The non-believers are referred 
to as tax-protestors.
107
 As in the medieval period, a champion lawyer of 
the Department of Justice publicly performs the prosecution of protestors. 
 
 
 105. Camp, supra note 59, at 60. 
 106. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 40–41 (“[F]or the rule was that if the accused ‘held out’ and did 
not confess, the magistrate was forced to drop the charges. The tortured man had then won.”). 
 107. See IRS Notice 2015-23 (“The Truth about Frivolous Tax Arguments”).  
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As described in detail by Foucault, this outcome is the modern equivalent 
of the display of the dead and mutilated body of the medieval criminal, 
hung with a placard at the crossroads in front of the castle as a warning to 
passers-by.
108
  
The average American interacts with the government on a biweekly 
basis through the withholding of tax tithes out of her paycheck. The 
automatic taking of money describes the primary relation of government 
to the governed in the United States. Congress delegated its taxing power 
in its entirety to the IRS. Since no IRS officials are elected by the people 
they govern, the idea that the United States is a “representative, 
constitutional democracy” does not accurately describe the interaction of 
the average American with the government via tax enforcement procedure.  
CONCLUSION 
[Society] understand[s] the term “democracy” to refer to the process 
by which people create for themselves the form of organized 
existence within which they live. Only by creating these forms 
together can people confront the intersubjective nature of social life. 
Moreover, unless people do so themselves, the artificial structures 
through which they operate will threaten to function beyond their 
control.
109 
With the delegation of the taxing authority to the IRS, an 
administrative agency, the United States Congress indirectly empowered 
the IRS to exact punishment for tax crimes in a manner that is not 
consistent with the freedom of individuals and is also extraordinarily 
impractical.
110
 Indeed, the IRS appears to collect far less in enforcement 
revenue than the amount of social costs that it imparts upon American 
society.
 
Nelson argues that without a steady supply of criminals there 
would be no need for police services.
111
 With regard to the IRS, Nelson’s 
observation is greatly magnified. Since the IRS often engages in the 
 
 
 108. Id. at 113 (“At the crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges 
built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny 
theatres of punishment.”).  
 109. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 
1296 (1984). 
 110. Id. at 1295 (“Bureaucracy is the primary form of organized power in America today, and it is 
therefore a primary target for those who seek liberation from modern forms of human domination. The 
ideology that reassures us that bureaucracy is legitimate is demobilizing because it conceals the need 
to reorder American society to bring to life better versions of the ideal of human freedom.”).  
 111. Nelson, supra note 28, at 59. 
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redefinition of “Truth” as part of tax enforcement proceedings to its own 
definition irrespective of the actual tax law. Thus, the IRS directly creates 
“wrongdoing” as part of its enforcement process thereby itself creates the 
resultant tax delinquents within society. The tax law is indeterminate and 
the IRS uses its enforcement discretion principally to create tax 
delinquents. Accordingly, Nelson is quite right in her observation that 
there would not be as many tax delinquents if the IRS adopted a more 
pragmatic approach to the interpretation of tax laws.  
The punishment enforced by the IRS on persons who act in violation of 
its will is representative of its power and directly analogous to those 
punishments described by Foucault in Discipline and Punish. Rubin 
argues that “Discipline and Punish may be read to assert that freedom 
from the comprehensive, oppressive control mechanisms of modern 
society can only be achieved by transforming the specific and apparently 
functional elements of modern social institutions.”112 However, as 
described by Simon, judges often rationalize the punishment of 
wrongdoers with a reformatory goal.
113
 In the context of IRS punishment, 
however, there is no reformatory goal. The automated IRS acts exactly as 
an actuary machine in its enforcement actions against individual 
taxpayers.
114
 According to Simon, that means the actuary tries to 
“maximize the efficiency of the population as it stands . . . [r]ather than 
seeking to change people.”115 But, the operation of the bureaucracy for the 
enlightenment of society is the stated purpose of any bureaucracy.
116
 In the 
modern United States, the bureaucracy operates primarily for the sake of 
bureaucracy. The creation of a social class of permanent tax delinquents 
within the United States represents at minimum an extraordinarily 
expensive and impractical tax policy.  
 
 
 112. Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the 
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1421 (1996).  
 113. Jonathan Simon, The Return of the Medical Model: Disease and the Meaning of 
Imprisonment from John Howard to Brown v. Plata, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 217, 232 (2013). 
 114. Simon, supra note 19, at 797 (“Lacking any imaginable regression coefficient that could 
prove the effects of actuarial practices, we are left with only the possibility of shared responses to the 
way these practices operate on us as rituals . . . As the institutional fabric of society is colonized by 
actuarial practices it becomes more difficult to invoke political and moral responses in ourselves and 
others”). 
 115. Id. at 773 (“Rather than seeking to change people (‘normalize them,’ in Foucault’s apt 
phrase), an actuarial regime seeks to manage them in place.”). 
 116. See King, supra note 4 at 194 (“A great deference, then, must be given to the state in 
conducting its activities for the benefit of its constituent individuals; after all, that is what the state was 
founded to do. This means its methods, if within reason, cannot be questioned as long as it achieves 
the goal of enlightenment.”). 
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